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There is little consensus concerning the truth or reference conditions for evaluative 
terms such as “good” and “bad.” In his paper “Good and Evil,” Geach (1956) 
proposed that we distinguish between attributive and predicative uses of “good.”  
Foot (2001), Thomson (2008), Kraut (2011), and others have put this distinction to 
use when discussing basic questions of value theory. In §§1-2, I outline Geach’s 
proposal and argue that attributive evaluation depends on a prior grasp of the kind of 
thing that is evaluated, which is another way of saying a prior grasp of a thing’s 
nature. In §§3-4, I discuss the evaluation of artifacts, which provide the clearest 
examples of attributive evaluation. This allows me to address a series of problems 
apparently facing the idea of attributive goodness. In §5, I consider the neo-
Aristotelian idea that we can extend attributive accounts of goodness to human lives, 
and I pay attention to Foot’s account of natural goodness. This leads me to consider 
the goodness of human life as a whole in §6. At this point. I depart from Geach’s 
approach and argue that questions of attributive goodness finally give rise to 
questions of predicative or absolute goodness.   
 
1. “Good” As an Attributive Adjective 
 
Grammarians distinguish between attributive and predicative adjectives. Geach 
(1956) drew philosophers’ attention to this distinction and argued that it could be 
extended and applied to our understanding of the logical grammar of evaluative terms.  
Consider a complex predicate of the form “is an AN” where A is an adjective and N 
is a noun. For example, “is a red book,” “is a sharp spade,” or “is a good move.”  By 
looking at the way complex predicates behave, we can draw a distinction between 
two types of adjectives. In some instances, the predication “X is an AN” logically 
decomposes into the two predications “X is an N” and “X is A.”  So, using Geach’s 
example, “X is a red book” logically decomposes into “X is a book” and “X is red.”1  
In these cases, the truth-value of the complex predication is simply the truth-value of 
the conjunction of its component predications—i.e., “X is an N” and “X is A.”  If it is 
true that X is red and it is true that X is a book, then it is true that X is a red book. 
When complex predicates behave in this way, we can say that the adjective is 
predicative. 
 
Significantly, however, not all adjectives behave like “red.” Some complex predicates 
are inferentially irregular in the sense that their truth-values are not given by the 
conjunction of their component predicates. In particular, Geach observed that the 
predicates “is good” and “is bad” are inferentially irregular. Thus, the predication “X 
is a good book” does not logically decompose into the predications “X is a book” and 
“X is good.”  If the proposition “X is a good book” is true, we cannot infer that “X is 
good” simpliciter. For one thing, it is obscure what it could mean to say that “X is 
good” (if not as an ellipsis for X is a good book).2 Or, consider the proposition “X is 
a good poison.” We cannot make two unqualified inferences that “X is a poison” and 
that “X is good.” Rather we mean something like “X is good as poison” or “X has all 
the properties poison should have” or “X is well-fitted to doing what poison is for.” 
In this sense “good” and “bad” are like “big” and “small.” We cannot infer from 
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“Fred is a big flea” that “Fred is big.” Even big fleas are rather small creatures. 
Rather, we should understand something like “Fred is big for a flea.” 
 
If Geach is right that the underlying logical form of “good” and “bad” suggests that 
they are attributive adjectives, then the predication “X is good” is incomplete. Geach 
put the point as follows: 
 
Even when ‘good’ or ‘bad’ stands by itself as a predicate, and is thus 
grammatically predicative, some substantive has to be understood; there is no 
such thing as being just good or bad, there is only being a good or bad so-and-so. 
(1956, p. 34)3   
 
Although I am not persuaded that “good” is always used in this way—I discuss an 
important predicative use in §6—it seems correct that predicative uses of “good” are 
not normally truth-evaluable as they stand. In order to determine the truth-value of a 
proposition of the form “X is good,” we need to know what X is. Moreover, 
depending on what X is, it may be the case that we cannot coherently employ the 
predicate “is good” at all. Foot (2001, p. 2) describes how she sometimes secured 
recognition of this point by holding up a small piece of torn paper and asking whether 
or not it was good. Offering to pass it round so the audience could get a better look 
would provoke laughter in recognition of the grammatical-cum-logical absurdity of 
the question. We cannot talk meaningfully about scraps of paper being good in an 
unqualified sense.   
 
In a similar vein, Thomson offers the following example: 
 
You are standing in front of the array of melons at your grocer’s, feeling helpless. 
Your grocer notices. He points to one in particular and says, “That one’s good.” 
… It would be utterly astonishing if when you asked, “Do you mean that that’s a 
good melon?” he replied, “Oh dear me no, I haven’t the faintest idea whether it’s 
a good melon, I meant only that it’s a good thing. (2008, p. 13) 
 
Again, this is comical and the comedy comes from the fact that it generally makes no 
sense to say that a thing is simply good as opposed to a good instance of its kind. 
 
Thomson (1997, 2008) argues that there is a metaphysical explanation for this sense 
of absurdity. It is often thought that goodness is a property. Surface grammar 
suggests no difference between the predicate “is good” and predicates such as “is red” 
and “is spherical.” As it is normally the function of predicates to denote properties, it 
is natural to think that a sentence such as “X is good” has the function of attributing 
the property of goodness to X. With this picture in mind, it is then natural to think 
that the primary task of ethics is to identify whatever property the predicate “is good” 
denotes, or the universal that particular instances of good things instantiate. Once we 
have done this, we can ask where this property is instantiated and how this should 
guide our conduct. 
 
This view is undoubtedly attractive and a great deal of moral theory has presupposed 
it. Influentially, G. E. Moore held this sort of view of ethics. When he wrote that 
ethics is “the general enquiry into what is good,” (PE 2) he meant that ethics is the 
general enquiry into what the property of goodness is and what has that property. 
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Similarly, when he wrote that “the only possible reason that can justify any action is 
that by it the greatest possibility of what is good absolutely should be realised” (PE 
60), he meant that we should maximize the number of instances of the property of 
goodness. For this reason, Thomson (1997, p. 273) calls this sort of view “Moore’s 
story,” although it is far from being peculiar to Moore.4 Thomson also suggests that 
Moore’s commitment to the view that goodness is a property had a baleful influence 
on subsequent metaethics. For it is very difficult to see what property could be 
exemplified by all of the things that are good or how we should go about identifying 
this property. Locating the property of goodness in the natural order is an especially 
daunting task—all the more so for those who think that recognizing the good 
necessarily motivates us. Consequently, Thomson suggests that the property of 
goodness is epistemologically and metaphysically “dark” (2008, p. 11). This is 
reminiscent of Mackie’s complaint that moral properties would have to be “queer” for 
moral predicates to refer.  
 
Moore’s own view, of course, was that goodness is an unanalyzable, non-natural 
property that is outside the causal order and revealed by a sui generis cognitive 
faculty of moral intuition. A more common response has been the non-cognitivist line 
that what is shared by all of those things we call “good” is not some mysterious 
property of goodness, but the fact that we approve of them in some way. Thus, 
normativity is built into judgment rather than the world. If, however, Geach was right 
that “good” and “bad” are attributive adjectives, then it appears that Moore’s story 
rests on a mistake. The fact that we are wont to say “X is good” disguises the fact that 
“is good” is an incomplete predicate. This sends us off in fruitless pursuit of the 
property denoted by the predicate “is good,” such as the universal goodness that all 
good things instantiate. However, it is no more plausible to think that there is a 
universal of goodness that all good things instantiate than to think that there is a 
universal of bigness instantiated by big fleas, big noses, and big attics.5 
 
Saying that there is no property of goodness is neither to say that the term “good” is 
meaningless nor to say that there is no property, or set of properties, denoted by 
particular attributive uses of the term. Nor, again, is it to say that there is nothing in 
virtue of which propositions including the term “good” are true. Nor, finally, is it to 
concede that the term “good” involves us in a hopeless hotchpotch of equivocation. 
We are still free to investigate how attributive uses of “good” function and under 
what conditions it is true to say that something is good (just as there are truth 
conditions for attributing “bigness” to fleas, noses, and attics). But in order to identify 
truthmakers for propositions with evaluative content, we need to consider the kind of 
thing that is claimed to be good or bad. I approach this task below, starting with the 
(relatively) straightforward case of artifacts, before looking at natural functions and 
then human lives. I offer the qualification in advance, however, that it would be 
unwise to assume that there is single, legitimate way in which “good” functions in 
English, let alone a single, legitimate way in which cognate and near cognates of 
“good” function in other languages.6  In the end, however, my concern is much less 
with logical grammar or with natural language than with hints about the metaphysics 
of value. 
 
2. Goodness, Grading, and Kinds 
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One way in which we might understand how the term “good” functions is suggested 
by Urmson’s (1950, 1968) observation that “good” is used primarily as a term for 
grading. To say that something is good is normally to say that it measures up more or 
less well to some standard or set of criteria.7 For instance, to say that an apple is good 
is to say, inter alia, that it has a pleasing taste, is pest-free, is relatively blemish-free, 
and stores well. To the extent that an apple meets these criteria, it is a good apple. To 
the extent that it falls short of these standards, it is a bad apple. Approximation to a 
standard also helps us to make comparative judgments. Thus, Urmson pays careful 
attention to the classificatory scheme of “super,” “extra fancy,” “fancy,” and 
“domestic” apple grades, detailing the particular characteristics of this ordered set of 
adjectives (1950, pp. 151-154). In this way, evaluative judgments appear to contrast 
with deontological judgments. Because “good” is a scalar adjective, we can say that 
one thing is better, more excellent, or closer to the ideal than another. By contrast, we 
do not normally say that something is “righter” or more obligatory than something 
else.   
 
Because “good,” unlike “right,” has comparative and superlative forms, Evans 
objects that Urmson’s account cannot deal with a single specimen of a kind. Evans 
writes:  
 
We could not compare it with anything and, therefore, we could not say it was 
good in the sense of being good of its kind. There can be no superlative 
judgments unless there can also be comparative judgments. (1962, p. 30) 
 
This shows an interesting misunderstanding. When we grade an example of a kind, 
the comparison is not with other members of the kind—although such comparisons 
can guide our judgment—but with a standard or set of criteria given by the nature of 
the kind.8 Although we can grade apples, students, and many other things in order to 
rank them, grading is not essentially concerned with intraclass comparisons. It could 
be that all members of a kind are equally excellent, or far from the ideal. Perhaps 
Evans’s objection is due to the thought that we would struggle to evaluate a single 
instance of a kind we had not previously encountered. This is comparable to the 
difficulty we might face in evaluating an antique artifact with unknown origins and 
purpose. It would not help, however, to encounter a trove of antique artifacts with 
minor differences. We do not need a comparison class, but an understanding of what 
constitutes the relevant standard of evaluation—i.e., what kind of thing we have in 
front of us.   
 
How, though, are we to determine the relevant standard or standards? The 
considerations of the previous section suggest that there will be no single answer. 
Rather, it will depend on the kind of thing we are evaluating. This was part of 
Geach’s point in saying that a substantive must be understood when we make 
attributions of goodness. The proposition “X is good” is typically elliptical for the 
proposition “X is a good K,” where K is the kind to which X belongs.9 As the 
properties of good apples are quite different from those of good students, the two 
kinds are not evaluated against the same standards or criteria. This suggests a two-
stage procedure for determining the truth-values of propositions of the form “X is 
good.” First, we identify the kind K to which X belongs. Second, we measure X 
against the standards that are appropriate for things of kind K.10  We do not, as 
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Moore’s story might suggest, independently determine whether X belongs to K and 
whether X instantiates the property of goodness.   
 
Although these two steps of identifying and evaluating X are conceptually separable, 
they often rely on one another. In particular, identifying X as belonging to K can 
depend on identifying certain normative conditions that X satisfies. For instance, part 
of what it is to identify an object as a spade is to identify it as a digging implement.  
This is to say that it must have certain properties that fit it for its purpose.11 “Spade” 
is a success term in the sense that an object that is not at all suitable for digging could 
not count as one. Although there are such things as rusty, blunt, and lightweight 
spades, there is no such thing as a spade made out of room-temperature tofu or 
mathematical formulae. Of course, the line between a bad spade and a non-spade may 
be vague or otherwise hard to determine. We can imagine, for example, a good spade 
that is left to rust and gradually deteriorate. Finally, it will become more rust than 
spade and so bad that it will no longer be a spade.12 Sadly the same is true of us.  
Deteriorating function eventually undermines personhood. There are genuine 
difficulties here concerning vagueness. However, whatever line we take, we should 
not conclude that there are no persons or no spades. 
 
3 Functional Goodness and Artifacts 
 
I want to raise three potential concerns in this section. One concern facing kind-
dependent standards of evaluation is that many kinds seem to have no plausible 
standards against which they can be evaluated. For instance, Raz argues:  
 
[R]egarding many kinds of things it does not make sense to ask what is a good 
or well-functioning thing of that kind. There are no good or well-functioning 
stones, or pebbles, or streams, or hail, or snow, or mountains, or stars, or black 
holes, or electrons, or photons, and so on. (2003, p. 142) 
 
A second concern is that a kind-dependent account of goodness does not yet tell us 
how to determine the particular criteria against which to evaluate an instance of a 
kind. Thus, even if we can establish that there are standards for a kind, we still need 
to determine what those standards are. A third concern is that any such standards are 
not properly normative. Investigating the first concern will help us to make some 
progress with the second. I shall postpone discussion of the third concern until the 
final section of the paper. 
 
Let us take mud as an example. Mud can be good for the purposes of, or good from 
the point of view of, farmers, brick-makers, and bathing hippopotamuses. It is hard, 
however, to see what it would mean to say that a particular clod is quite simply 
good.13 Put another way, there is nothing that it is to be good qua mud, or for mud to 
have its goodness within itself, even though mud may be good qua something else 
(building material, cooling lubricant, etc.). So, it appears that some kinds, such as 
spades, come with evaluative standards built into their identity conditions. As 
Thomson puts it, some kinds are “goodness-fixing” (2008, p. 21). Or, emphasizing 
the other side of the same relationship, Raz talks of “kind-constituting values” (2003, 
p. 39). Other kinds, like mud, are neither goodness-fixing nor constituted by values. 
Ideally, we should like a principled way to distinguish the one from the other. 
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Philosophers attracted to a neo-Aristotelian naturalism about value may be inclined to 
approach this question via Aristotle’s function (ergon) argument. The Greek term 
“ergon” is ambiguous in a potentially suggestive and helpful way, having 
connotations of both “function” and “characteristic work.” As Aristotle writes, “What 
a thing is is always determined by its function: a thing really is itself when it can 
perform its function; an eye, for instance when it can see” (Meteorologica 390a10-2). 
So, the ideas of a thing’s function, and what it is that makes it the kind of thing that it 
is, are related to the idea of its ergon. To know, or to understand, what some kinds of 
things are, is, in part, to know what they are for; and this has significance when we 
come to evaluate instances of a kind. As I suggested above in the case of a spade, 
identifying something as an instance of a kind can depend on recognizing that it is at 
least minimally suited for performing its function. It is for this reason that the two 
steps of identifying the kind to which a thing belongs, and evaluating it, can be 
inseparable. 
 
So, for instance, a spade, unlike the mud it disturbs, is for something. Because spades 
are for digging, a good spade has properties that fit it for that end. Because mud does 
not have a function, it does not make sense to think of mud as being good or bad 
except in relation to something else. Mud may be used for something, and may be 
good for that purpose in the sense of being useful, but it is not for anything. If this 
explanation of goodness-fixing is along the right lines, and if goodness is related to 
grading in something like the way I suggested in §2, then we should expect that the 
goodness of X will depend on the degree to which it fulfils the function of the kind K 
to which it belongs. This allows us to distinguish certain kinds that have built-in or 
intrinsic standards of evaluation. It also moves us in the direction of understanding 
what the standards of evaluation are for those kinds. 
 
4. Artifacts and Design 
 
It might be objected that the example of a spade allows me to make the case too 
easily that the goodness of a thing depends on its function. Spades are unusual 
because they are artifacts, which have been designed for a purpose. Perhaps, then, if a 
spade has a function, and its function fixes its goodness as an instance of a kind, this 
is only because of its designer’s intentions. Following this, we can distinguish two 
types of concern: noting that a spade has the function of digging (i) fails to pick out 
any non-arbitrary metaphysical truths about goodness-fixing kinds, or (ii) fails to 
yield any significant insights concerning the evaluation of non-artifacts. I shall pick 
up the second concern in the next section. According to the first concern, even if we 
can talk of a spade as having the function of digging, we might just as easily assign it 
the function of being a doorstop, a weapon, or a work of art. Moreover, even if its 
designer intended the spade to function as a digging implement, why suppose that the 
designer’s intentions have any sort of priority over, say, its user’s intentions? Why 
suppose that either carves axiological reality at its joints? After all, a spade can be 
used for diverse purposes, including keeping doors open. It may even be good as a 
doorstop, or make a good doorstop. It might then seem that reflections concerning a 
spade’s function fail to settle questions concerning its goodness. The goodness of a 
spade depends entirely on its instrumental value with respect to the interests it serves. 
A heavy spade with a sharp edge is good because it enables us to do the things we 
want to do—plant potatoes, bury treasure, and the like—not because it measures up 
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to an evaluative standard given by a goodness-fixing function that is independent of 
its user’s interests. 
 
Some of this should be conceded. The function of a spade is evidently dependent in 
certain ways on human agency. It is not a coincidence that the goodness-making 
features of spades are, by and large, those features that give it instrumental value with 
respect to our needs and interests. A spade is an artifact designed with the satisfaction 
of our interests in mind and constructed so that it can be used by creatures like us in 
an environment like ours. A spade that is too heavy to lift, for example, is ipso facto a 
bad spade. However, it does not follow that we are unable to evaluate spades 
independently of either our present concerns or our personal concerns (which I 
suspect is what the worry largely amounts to). Nor does it follow that identifying an 
object’s function is entirely arbitrary or wholly dependent on the intentions, or 
interests, of its designer or user. We can, for example, recognize the excellence, or 
shoddy workmanship, of a piece of obsolete or alien technology. We can also 
evaluate artifacts that we do not want—to say “this is a good spade” is not necessarily 
to say “I want this spade,” even a little.14 One might have absolutely no interest in 
planting potatoes or the like, and still correctly believe that a particular spade is a 
good one. So, even if artifacts are designed in response to human interests or 
concerns, it does not follow that evaluating the goodness or quality of the artifact 
must depend on taking into account the evaluator’s current wants or interests. Indeed, 
it is arguable that we are able to evaluate artifacts in light of their function even if that 
function serves no possible human interest. Some weapons may fall into this category. 
 
Perhaps, though, it will be suggested that it is the designer’s intentions that matter, 
and that this explains the weapons case. Given that a weapon has been designed to 
cause terrible casualties (however contrary to anyone’s actual interests), we can say 
that the weapon is good to the extent that it is well suited to satisfying its designer’s 
intentions. Furthermore, it might be argued on epistemological grounds that it would 
be very difficult to know the function of an artifact if we were ignorant of the 
designer’s intentions. The quality of an artifact—say, a carving—can be inscrutable 
when we are unaware of the role it was intended to serve, or the social norms, 
conventions, and connotations associated with the artifact. But it still does not follow 
that a designer can arbitrarily assign a function to an artifact. The reason, as I have 
already mentioned, is that terms that refer to functional kinds, such as “spade,” are 
success terms. This comes from the fact that the function of an object depends on the 
criteria of identity for objects of that kind. So, a spade could be entirely unfitted for 
use as a doorstop or a weapon and still be a spade (perhaps it is the wrong shape or 
too heavy to wield), but it could not be entirely unfitted for digging and still be a 
spade. Although a designer may well have a function in mind, that designer cannot 
decide at will that an artifact has a particular function. An artifact’s function depends 
on it possessing a set of properties, such as a suitable arrangement of its parts and 
materials, organized with respect to the achievement of some end. 
 
5. Natural Goodness 
 
The second type of objection I mentioned above allows that the function of artifacts 
such as spades provide us with legitimate examples of goodness, but claims that 
artifacts such as spades are atypical insofar as they are the products of rational agency. 
Therefore, they can hardly serve as paradigm cases of goodness.15  One possible 
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response would be to argue that the world is the product of a Creator and therefore 
shot through with rational purpose or design. A functional account of goodness seems 
to fit well with a theistic framework and it is probably not a coincidence that a 
number of prominent neo-Aristotelians are theists. 16  Given certain further 
assumptions concerning the attributes of God, this view would also seem to have just 
the right shape for grounding the to-be-pursued quality of goodness. Although this 
line of thought is attractive in the present context, it depends on theistic commitments 
that many philosophers, including myself, do not share. I propose, therefore, to set it 
aside and consider an alternative possibility. 
 
It is often observed that even if the world is not the product of rational design, we are 
still able to understand much of the biological world in design terms. In particular, 
evolutionary theory provides an explanation for a large number of apparently 
teleological features in nature. While natural selection is unintentioned, it tends to 
produce organisms with parts and processes that are structured towards fitness-
enhancing ends. The case looks particularly strong for parts or organs that contribute 
to complex biological systems. For instance, it seems natural to say that hearts are for 
pumping blood, that eyes are for seeing, that roots are for absorbing nutrients, etc.  A 
plausible explanation for these biological functions can be given in terms of the 
evolutionary pressures bearing on an organism’s ancestors.17  The reason that the 
function of the human heart is to pump blood and not, say, to make a thumping sound 
is that only the former made a contribution to the fitness of our ancestors.  
 
These examples seem to fit well with a functional account of goodness. Given that 
the function of the eye is to see, it is very plausible that a good eye sees well. Perhaps 
more interesting, however, is the thought that evolution works at the level of 
behavioural traits. In particular, certain behavioural traits are adaptive for a species in 
the context of a distinctive way of life or “life-form” (Thompson 2008). For instance, 
climbing well is adaptive for squirrel monkeys because they primarily live on fruit 
that grows on trees. Or, again, signaling well is adaptive for meerkats because they 
live in social groups and are individually vulnerable to predators. 
 
It looks attractive, then, to say that at least some traits can be evaluated in terms of 
their contribution to a species’ way of life. But, of course, we are also a species of 
animal with a distinctive way of life. Perhaps most significantly, we are, as MacIntyre 
(1999) calls us, “dependent rational animals.” We are social and linguistic animals, 
vulnerable to each other and to our environment, and capable of representing reasons 
to ourselves and to others. So, as with other animals, we might say that a trait is good 
when it is conducive to success with respect to our distinctive way of life. In the case 
of humans, stable traits of character, feeling, and thought are traditionally called 
virtues when they are good and vices when they are bad. As with other animals’ traits, 
these valuable traits depend on both nature and nurture. We become virtuous, if at all, 
through a combination of inheritance, instruction, luck, practice, and experience. 
 
All of the above is quite programmatic. Nevertheless, considerations such as these 
have encouraged a number of philosophers to develop neo-Aristotelian forms of 
ethical naturalism.18 They mean “naturalism” not in the sense of deferring ethics to 
the natural sciences, but in the sense of attempting to ground ethics in human nature. 
Perhaps Foot (2001) did most towards developing an account of natural goodness 
along these lines. The idea of natural goodness attractively connects the evaluation of 
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human lives with our natural history and distinctive way of life, hence Geach’s well-
known comment that “men need virtues as bees need stings” (1977, p. 17). 
Presumably, we could have evolved quite differently, but we are as we are with our 
special strengths and vulnerabilities, and these facts matter when we come to reflect 
upon what counts as living well for beings like us.   
 
It is important to recognize that although natural selection has partly made us what 
we are (and more fully made other animals what they are), natural goodness is not a 
concept drawn directly from evolutionary biology. What matters is the place of 
particular traits in the life of a species as they have become. What Thompson calls 
“natural-historical judgments” (2008, p. 20) concerns the present nature of a species. 
These have an evolutionary explanation, but the norms that have resulted from our 
natural history are not justified by evolutionary considerations.19 Advocates of an 
ethics of natural goodness can avoid the charge that they are trafficking in 
explanatory reasons under the guise of justificatory reasons or crudely reducing value 
to reproductive fitness.20 What it is to be a good human depends on what it is to be a 
human, but not directly on the causal explanation of the nature of our species.21 
 
6. Reason and Value 
 
Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism builds on Geach’s insight that “good” is 
(typically) attributive. If we are interested in what it is to live well, we get off on the 
wrong foot by asking with Moore “What is good?” Instead, we should ask “What is it 
to be a good human being?” Moreover, our approach to answering this question 
shouldn’t be radically disjunct from the way in which we evaluate other living 
organisms. We should study the parts, processes, and traits that are fitted towards the 
ends appropriate for things of the relevant kind. To my mind, this is a promising 
approach to practical philosophy. Notwithstanding a number of prominent advocates, 
however, it remains a minority view. In this final section, I want to look at one 
possible source of resistance, which I shall relate back to the distinction between 
predicative and attributive adjectives. It is the concern that I briefly raised in §3—
namely, that attributive goodness is not genuinely normative. 
   
While advocates of neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism emphasize the continuity 
between humans and other living organisms, it might seem that our differences matter 
more for the purposes of evaluative discourse and, especially, morality. In particular, 
it is distinctive of human rationality that we can represent putative sources of value to 
ourselves and submit them to critical scrutiny. As Foot observes, “while animals go 
for the good (thing) that they see, human beings go for what they see as good” (2001: 
56). Irrespective of whether humans are unique in the way that Foot suggests, rational 
beings like us face a special sort of problem. Even if we agree that there are norms of 
natural goodness, it seems, on the face of it, to be an open question as to whether we 
should reflectively endorse these norms.22 As Slote (2003) observes, it is hard to deny 
that we are a warlike species or that aggression between subgroups of humans has 
been a pervasive feature of human history. Nevertheless, most of us would reject the 
conclusion that warlike behaviour is good for human beings.23 It might be replied that 
aggression and war are (normally) harmful for creatures like us. We do not flourish 
under such conditions. Although this is right, Slote objects that it is unclear how this 
response can be directly grounded in natural goodness. If warfare is part of our 
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distinctive way of life, it appears that the response employs an independent criterion 
in order to evaluate norms of natural goodness.  
 
We should not rest content, then, with the thought that some trait is good in relation 
to our distinctive way of life. Rather, as rational beings we have the ability to 
question whether we should reflectively endorse the pursuit of particular goods. 
Perhaps the goal of leading good human lives understood along neo-Aristotelian lines 
should be rejected. Arguably, only values that can survive this process of rational 
scrutiny are candidates for being truly normative—for being standards that make 
claims on the thought and action of rational animals like us.  
 
Here is one way to make sense of this concern. I suggested in §1 that “good” is not 
always used in its attributive sense. Geach dismisses predicative uses of “good” as “a 
peculiarly philosophical use of words” (1956, p. 36). However, this looks like ad hoc 
monster-barring. Expressions like “friendship is good,” “health is good,” “pleasure is 
good,” and “God saw that the light was good” are common enough. What, then, is the 
point of such expressions? One possibility is that people intend to express their 
ontological commitments with respect to the properties of friendship, health, pleasure, 
or light. But this strikes me as implausible. In fact, it is unclear that everyday 
discourse commits us to any particular view of the metaphysics of evaluative 
properties (see further Johnston (1993)). Most of us are hard pressed to explain the 
metaphysical pictures or assumptions that lie behind our moral judgments.  
 
I propose instead that the predicative form is normally used to express another idea. I 
have in mind the sort of usage Wiggins describes as follows: 
 
What the philosophical lexicographer recapitulates under “good”, we might say, 
is the history of our constant interrogation of the life that we lead and the place 
where we lead it, our constant interrogation of the things that concern us or 
might concern us or ought to concern us.  (2009, p. 198) 
 
Pace Geach, we sometimes use the word “good” in a predicative sense to mean the 
sort of thing that is intrinsically worthy of pursuit, or the sort of thing that finally 
stands up to interrogation. We do not mean that pleasure, friendship, and health are 
good of their kind, or that they are instrumentally valuable, but that they are good 
things and that it is, therefore, rational to pursue them. 
 
It seems, then, that we can understand the kinds of worries expressed about the value 
of a life of natural goodness as reflecting the following question: Is a life that is good 
in the attributive sense a life that is worthy of pursuit? Thus, when we consider 
whether to reflectively endorse a way of life, our own or someone else’s, we can ask 
whether it is good in the no-holds-barred predicative sense. Such questions lead 
quickly on to general enquiries into the human condition and whether life is good or 
meaningful. I want to conclude with a few observations about the conditions under 
which they arise and how the relationship between attributive and predicative 
evaluations helps us to understand them.   
 
In this context, consider Tolstoy’s account of his doubts concerning the meaning or 
value of his own life. In My Confession, he recalls that at the height of his literary 
success, financially secure and with a loving wife and family, the question kept 
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pressing upon him “Why? Well, and then?” (1987, p. 10) whenever he considered 
any prospective good. Repeatedly hitting upon this question, he reported: 
 
I felt that what I was standing on had given way, that I had no foundation to 
stand on, that that which I had lived by no longer existed, and that I had nothing 
to live by.  (1987, p. 11) 
 
There was apparently little doubt in Tolstoy’s mind that he was leading a good human 
life in the sense of achieving the kinds of goods that are typically available to us. Yet, 
he was unsure whether or not to reflectively endorse a life characterized by these 
goods. These are uncertainties that press themselves upon many reflective people at 
some point or another. 
 
I suggest that we can understand Tolstoy’s predicament as follows: the attributive 
goodness of his life left its predicative goodness an open question. Let’s call the 
question of the predicative goodness of an attributively good life “Tolstoy’s Question.” 
Tolstoy partly assuaged his concerns, and alleviated his depression, by finding value 
in God’s design. If we could be confident that our natures had been shaped by a 
benevolent and powerful Creator, then we could also be confident that our natures are 
basically good. If so, to do well in the attributive sense would be to do well in the 
predicative sense too. If there is no such Creator, however, we may have less reason 
to be sanguine. Perhaps our nature is more like that of an OncoMouse or a broiler 
chicken in the sense that our parts and processes are organized with respect to ends 
that we would not reflectively endorse. 
 
How might we provide a secular answer to Tolstoy’s Question? One possibility is to 
look for an answer in terms of our interests or what we think of as being good for us. 
Thus, we might express the hope that evolutionary forces have molded us such that, 
unlike the constitution of a broiler chicken, our constitution is well suited to meeting 
our interests. Depending on one’s theory of interests, it is a short step to ask whether 
attributive goodness satisfies our desires or preferences. This pattern of dialectic is 
both ancient and common. In Plato’s Republic, Socrates attempts to persuade 
Thrasymachus that justice is part of flourishing. Philosophers in the social-contract 
tradition appeal to the idea of “enlightened self-interest.” And the view that (moral) 
goodness benefits its possessor has been defended by some contemporary virtue 
ethicists.24 Perhaps, then, an attributively good life is worthy of pursuit because it 
satisfies our interests. Let’s call this the Socratic Answer. 
 
The question of whether an attributively good life is good for us in the sense of 
satisfying our interests is certainly an important one. Although I am doubtful that we 
should accept the Socratic Answer, I cannot pursue that question here. Rather, I want 
to point out that the Socratic Answer leaves important elements of Tolstoy’s Question 
unanswered. In particular, its egocentric starting point fails to take account of the 
variety of perspectives from which an attributively good life could be evaluated. It is 
not that any defence of the Socratic Answer must be substantively egocentric in the 
sense that it only considers self-interest. As most of us have a mixture of self- and 
other-regarding interests, an egocentric question can receive a partly other-regarding 
reply. The problem is that the Socratic Answer is formally egocentric. Thus, we 
might be persuaded that we are adapted to satisfy our own interests, but remain 
concerned that satisfying those interests is not a good thing from some perspective 
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that is not our own. For the fact that we have the interests that we do is no less a fact 
about our nature than any other fact. The normative significance of our interests is, 
therefore, just as much open to interrogation as anything else.     
 
To make the point dramatically, perhaps our nature is like that of the smallpox or 
Zika virus. From the point of view of the universe, perhaps we should wish for our 
own demise. Some environmental ethicists would remind us that such thoughts are 
not entirely silly as we stand at the threshold of the Anthropocene. However, the 
point is not that we should (or should not) adopt this view of ourselves. Instead, the 
point is that the matter is not settled by reflecting on our interests or preferences. As 
inveterate interrogators of what concerns us, we are led to question each aspect of our 
nature and this includes our interests and preferences. We might express such 
thoughts by asking about the relationship between attributive goodness and 
predicative goodness, or what I have called Tolstoy’s Question. Neither an account 
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1 Geach’s example is complicated by the fact that ascriptions of colour terms such as 
“red” are context dependent. For instance, “X is a white wine” does not decompose 
into “X is white” and “X is a wine.” White wine is a yellowish liquid. For more on 
this point see Thomson (2008, pp. 233-248). 
2 We can of course infer that “X is a book” and so the interest apparently lies with the 
adjective, not the noun. However, Rind and Tillinghast (2008, pp. 85-86) argue that 
this is a contingent feature of natural languages such as English and that it is possible 
to construct nouns that are inferentially irregular in the same way. 
3 J. L. Austin employs the metaphors of “good” being “substantive-hungry,” or as 
“crying out for substantives” (1962, pp. 68-69). In this sense, Austin suggests, “good” 
is similar to “real.”  Something of the same idea can be found in Hare (1952, p. 133). 
See also Hare (1957, p. 103) for a little more on the prehistory of Geach’s idea.  
4 Kraut (2011, pp. 10-15) traces a brief history of what he refers to as “absolute 
goodness” and finds similar stories in Plato, Aristotle, W. D. Ross, and Dworkin, 
among others. But see also his (2011, Appendix F) on Plato and Aristotle. 
5 See Aristotle, EN 1096b23–26. 
6 For more on this point, see Wiggins (2009, pp. 195-6).  
7  The etymology of “normativity,” from the Latin “norma” meaning “builder’s 
square,” also suggests a connection between the idea of a norm and the idea of 
measuring up. 
8 Korsgaard suggests that occasionally a single instance can define its own kind (2003, 
p. 79). She suggests that this may be true of a single, beautiful sunset. 
9 By “kinds,” I do not only mean natural kinds. Some roles, such as surgeon, student, 
or plumber, are also kinds in the relevant sense. Von Wright (1963, p. 19) proposes 
that the relevant notion of goodness for someone engaged in a particular role is 
goodness at or “technical” goodness. 
10 Raz defends a similar two-stage approach to evaluating genre-dependent kinds, 
such as the excellence of an opera or a romantic comedy. Raz’s view differs from 
mine, however, insofar as he holds that if a work “is a good instance of its genre, then 
it is a good work absolutely, not only good of its kind.” (2003, p. 45). 
11  Cp. Aristotle De Partibus Animalium 640b36-641a3 and De Anima 412b21-3; 
416a3-6. 
12 See further Korsgaard (2003, pp. 75-7). 
13 Nor, because mud cannot flourish, is there any state of affairs that is good for mud. 
See Fletcher (2012) for one recent analysis of the good for relation. 
14 Compare the oddness of thinking that “this tree has good roots” involves wanting 
those roots. For further defence of this point, see Foot (1961, pp. 57-60) or Thomson 
(2008, pp. 49-53). 
15 Pigden (1990, pp. 147-153), for instance, presses this line of objection against neo-
Aristotelian accounts of goodness. 
16  The Unmoved Mover of the Metaphysics also plays an important and 
underappreciated role in Aristotle’s ethical theory. When in Book X of the 
Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle makes the surprising move of advocating a life 
	 15	
																																																																																																																																																														
structured towards the end of intellectual activity (theoria) he suggests that it is “not 
insofar as he is a human that he will live like this, but insofar as there is something 
divine in him” (1177b26-7). The relationship between a flourishing life and 
participation in the divine is brought out most explicitly in the Eudemian Ethics: “If 
some choice or possession of natural goods – either goods of the body or money or of 
friends or the other goods – will most produce the speculation of god, that is best, and 
that is the finest limit; but whatever, whether through deficiency or excess, hinders 
the service and speculation of god, is bad” (1249b17-20; see also 1145a6-11). 
17  The locus classicus for this view is Wright (1973). For a useful overview of 
evolutionary approaches to the nature of functions, see Davies (2001). 
18  See, for instance, Hursthouse (1999), Foot (2001), Thompson (2008), Thomson 
(2008) and Hacker-Wright (2009, 2012). 
19  Compare my earlier comments on the relationship between a designer and a 
spade’s function. 
20 See, however, Millum (2006) for the complaint that this constitutes a move away 
from the relatively well-understood idea of evolutionary function, which partly 
motivates the idea of natural goodness in the first place. 
21 See Hursthouse (2012) for one recent response to this sort of misplaced criticism. 
22 Broome expresses a similar basic concern when he objects that Foot’s norms of 
natural goodness are not “truly normative” (2013, p. 12). Foot’s response to this sort 
of worry is that the pursuit of the human good is the rational choice. She supplements 
this with the argument that there is a closer connection between happiness and natural 
goodness than is generally recognized and that it is rational to pursue what makes us 
happy (2001: 94–7). 
23 Compare Glassen (1957), who argues that Aristotle’s ergon argument conflates the 
goodness of man with the good of man. We should be rightly unwilling to pursue the 
project of becoming good people were this poorly correlated with our welfare or the 
satisfaction of our needs and interests. 
24 See, for example, Hursthouse (1999, pp. 163-191) and Bloomfield (2016).	
25 Many thanks to Doug Campbell and Carolyn Mason for helpful discussion and 
suggestions.	
